What allies want: Appraising Britain’s defence relationships

Executive summary

• Barring an almost century of ‘splendid isolation’ at its geopolitical apex, the United Kingdom (UK) has been adept at forming and managing alliances to serve its interests. In the 21st century, Britain is enmeshed in a collection of formal alliances and strategic arrangements which help His Majesty’s (HM) Government to amplify the nation’s ability to achieve its objectives, multiply and accelerate its efforts, and extend its geostrategic reach. Alliances and partnerships are a crucial tool for catalysing national power to achieve goals which would be far more difficult (or even unachievable) if attempted alone. In other words, they are a way of inducing ‘strategic advantage’.
  
• The Council on Geostrategy conducted a survey of UK-based politicians, officials and experts involved in foreign and defence affairs which formed the basis of a Primer entitled ‘Who are Britain’s most important allies?’. This survey is the foundation for selecting the countries included in this Report. In the Euro-Atlantic space, the most significant allies and partners were identified as: the United States (US); Canada; Ukraine; France; Germany; Italy; Poland; Norway; and the Baltic states. In the Indo-Pacific, Australia, Japan, India, South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Taiwan were selected as the most noteworthy partners.
• For each of the countries, this Report summarises the most important and most recent bilateral defence developments and how the UK fits into the broader national security objectives of its allies and partners, including a summary of the three most important defence objectives each has when engaging with Britain.
  
• Despite underinvestment in defence capabilities in recent years, the UK is still a strongly desired partner and the broad defence expertise and capabilities which Britain possesses will be in high demand well into the 2030s.
• In sum, most allies and partners’ desires can be be grouped into four categories, which HM Government can leverage for strategic advantage:
  • An extended nuclear deterrent: Besides deterring the most extreme threats to British interests, the UK’s nuclear deterrent is a robust umbrella HM Government can offer allies, and potentially even key partners, under which to shelter. Few democracies possess nuclear weapons and even fewer are willing to extend their deterrent over others as Britain does. As the world becomes more volatile, this will become even more important to the UK’s allies – particularly as a second centre of nuclear decision making in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).
  • Conventional forces with the ability to project power: Although the British Armed Forces have been ‘hollowed out’ in recent years because of inadequate investment, allies and partners often cite the strength and experience of British forces as of high value. These forces help bring additional mass; more importantly, they bring an array of specialist capabilities many allies and partners do not themselves possess, particularly power projection capabilities and strategic enablers. However, within a constrained defence budget, Britain will face a challenge in maintaining a ‘full spectrum’ of capabilities, and it should explore serious questions about the benefits of a more focused force posture. Any such focused force should aim to lean into the UK’s strengths with the goal of minimising duplication and maximising complementation with the armed forces of allies and partners (within the national interest).
  • Military technological expertise: The scientific and technological edge of the UK’s defence sector, especially the aerospace and maritime domains, attracts British allies and partners. In particular, many allies and partners are eager for Britain to support their involvement in AUKUS Pillar II, capitalising on the strong integration between the UK and US military-technological spheres.
  • Buying foreign equipment: Although in relative terms Britain now invests historically low levels in defence (despite plans to increase expenditure), it is still one of the largest defence spenders in the world. Many allies want the UK to procure defence equipment from them to bolster their own defence industries.
• Of course, Britain cannot support every defence request of its allies and partners – and sometimes this may not serve the national interest. Supporting allies and partners should never be seen as an end in and of itself. To maximise strategic advantage, HM Government should seek also to instrumentalise its allies and partners to secure national objectives. Providing allies and partners with what they want should always be done with an eye to strengthening the cohesion and power of the alliance or partnership in question, as well as national geopolitical and geoeconomic objectives.
• Moving forward, HM Government should: 
  • Conduct a deeper appraisal of allies and partners as part of the SDR and establish an ‘Alliances Unit’ to help manage the vast network of British defence partnerships;
  • Bind defence relations between free and open countries closer together, particularly across the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, and to push for greater levels of assistance for Ukraine;
  • Improve interoperability and interchangeability between allies and partners;
  • Increase investment in defence to at least 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), taking into consideration: the increasingly volatile geopolitical situation; the importance allies and partners place on their defence relations with the UK; and the need to modernise and regenerate the British Armed Forces after years of underinvestment.